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Abstract: People tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin                             
et al. 2001). This phenomenon is known as the “illusion of asymmetric insight.” While the                             
illusion has been well documented by a series of recent experiments, less has been done to                               
explain it. In this paper, we argue that extant explanations are inadequate because they either                             
get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a                           
sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we propose a new explanation that does not face these                           
problems. The explanation is based on two other well-documented psychological                   
phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased way, and the                         
tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others. 
Keywords ​Illusion of asymmetric insight ∙ Interpersonal knowledge ∙ Biased evidence                     
assimilation ∙ Cognitive bias 
1. Introduction 
A series of recent psychological experiments suggest that people tend to think that they                           
know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). If Alice and Ben are as                                 
people are most, Alice will tend to think that she knows Ben better than Ben knows her,                                 
and Ben will tend to think that he knows Alice better than Alice knows him. This                               
phenomenon is known as the “illusion of asymmetric insight.” 
If people really do have a tendency to think that they know others better than others                               
know them, it must indeed reflect an illusion, at least for many of us. Although it may be                                   
the case that some ​people have superior interpersonal insight, this clearly cannot be the case                             
for the majority of us. Just like Alice and Ben cannot ​both be right in the example above,                                   
many of us must be wrong in taking ourselves to have superior insight into others. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate what ​explains the illusion of asymmetric insight.                             
This means searching for a psychological mechanism or pattern that can be held                         
responsible for the illusion. As it is, this explanatory challenge stands unmet. Extant                         
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explanations, we argue, are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction                       
wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way.                         
Instead, we will propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. 
The explanation consists of two parts. The first part posits a tendency to ​overestimate                           
our own insight into others. This tendency, we argue, is predicted by another                         
well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely the tendency to accommodate               
ambiguous evidence in a biased manner. Since third-personal evidence about other                     
people’s inner feelings and motives is often highly ambiguous, we will tend to take such                             
evidence to confirm our prior beliefs about the personal characteristics of other people,                         
thereby making us prone to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. The second part                         
of our explanation posits a tendency to ​underestimate other people’s insight into us. This                           
tendency, we argue, is predicted by yet another well-documented psychological                   
phenomenon, namely the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves                       
than we know others. This might seem surprising: how could the relatively innocuous idea                           
that we know ourselves better than we know others have the effect of making us prone to                                 
underestimate how well other people know us? We show that, when coupled with a few                             
other well-supported auxiliary hypotheses, it can in fact have that effect. Together these                         
two tendencies—the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight, and the                     
tendency to underestimate that of others—provide a simple and well-founded explanation                     
of the illusion of asymmetric insight that can predict important details in the experimental                           
findings.  
Why is it important to understand the psychological underpinnings of the illusion of                         
asymmetric insight? One set of reasons has to do with social interaction. If we think that                               
we know others better than others know us, it is natural to suspect that we will be inclined                                   
to invest more effort in correcting other people’s perception of ​us than in correcting our                             
own perception of ​others​. We will tend to talk when we should listen, and will become                               
impatient or defensive when others suggest that we have misinterpreted their statements or                         
motives. This might lead to socially undesirable outcomes, such as entrenched                     
disagreement and conflict (Pronin et al. 2001, pp. 652-53; Kennedy and Pronin 2008). But                           
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if we understand the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for these impulses, we                         
might be in a better position to correct or alleviate them. 
A second set of reasons concerns how the illusion of asymmetric insight relates to                           
various other psychological phenomena. If our explanation is correct, understanding the                     
illusion of asymmetric insight may be of even greater importance than previously thought.                         
On the prevalent explanation, the illusion of asymmetric insight is seen as an effect of                             
another illusory conviction about the relative importance of introspection for knowing                     
ourselves versus other people: we tend to think that knowing ​us requires access to inner                             
thoughts and feelings, whereas we can know ​others quite well merely on the basis of                             
observable behavior (Pronin et al. 2004 and 2008; Pronin 2009). This so-called                       
“introspection illusion” is relevant for understanding a wide range of psychological                     
phenomena, including people’s tendency to make dispositional inferences about others,                   
but not about themselves (Jones and Nisbett 1972), and their tendency to see others as                             
being more susceptible to cognitive and motivational biases than they themselves are                       
(Pronin et al. 2002 and 2004). But if we are right, the prevalent explanation gets the                               
direction of explanation wrong: it is the illusion of asymmetric insight that gives rise to the                               
introspection illusion, rather than ​vice versa​. As such, our explanation of the illusion of                           
asymmetric insight stands to explain a much wider set of psychological phenomena related                         
to the introspection illusion as well. 
We do not present new empirical findings in this article. Rather, we base our                           
explanation on its ability to account for the available data, and on the significant amount                             
of independent support that has been given for the auxiliary hypotheses that we invoke.                           
However, we also highlight some interesting novel predictions of our explanation to be                         
tested in future experimental work. 
The agenda for the rest of paper is as follows. After reviewing the relevant                           
experimental findings by Pronin et al. (§2), we argue that existing explanations of the                           
illusion of asymmetric insight are inadequate (§3). We then present our new explanation of                           
the illusion (§4), argue that it does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the existing                               
ones (§5), and show that it can explain a two further psychological effect unearthed by                             
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Pronin et al. (§6). Finally, we describe a hitherto untested third-personal version of the                           
illusion of asymmetric insight, which may serve to test our explanation in further studies                           
(§7). 
2. The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight 
Pronin et al. (2001) report a group of five studies designed to test the hypothesis that                               
people tend to think that they know others better than others know them. Below we                             
briefly review the setup and results of each study. 
First study: Participants were asked to think of a close friend and rate (on a scale from                                 
1-11) how well they felt they knew or understood their friend, and how well they felt their                                 
friend knew or understood them. The study revealed a tendency among the participants to                           
rate their knowledge of their friend higher than their friend’s knowledge of them. 
Second study: Pairs of same-sex college roommates were asked a number of questions                         
about how well they felt they knew their roommate, and how well they felt their roommate                               
knew them. For example, the participants were asked to rate (on a scale from 1-11) how                               
well they felt they knew how shy their roommate was, and how well they felt their                               
roommate knew how shy they were. In line with the first study, the participants tended to                               
rate their knowledge of their roommate higher than their roommate’s knowledge of them.                         
The study also sought to determine whether the effect would be more pronounced for                           
judgments involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities                 
rather than public and observable ones, and more pronounced for judgments involving                       
relatively negative qualities rather than positive or neutral ones. For both contrasts, a                         
significantly increased effect was found. The private and unobservable qualities included in                       
this part were: “real” feelings, motives for action, doing things for the purpose of fitting in,                               
and doing things just for the purpose of pleasing others. The study also gave support to an                                 
intrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, whereby people tend to think                         
that they know themselves better than others know themselves. Again, this tendency was                         




Third study: ​Participants were given a questionnaire in which they were asked to                         
describe when they were “most like themselves”, and when their close friend was “most like                             
himself or herself.” The participants tended to give more weight to privately accessible                         
thoughts and feelings when describing themselves, while giving more weight to publicly                       
available information about performance and behavior when describing their friends.                   
Pronin et al. take this to reflect a tendency to think that it is harder to gain insight into                                     
oneself than it is to gain insight into others. 
Fourth study: ​Pairs of previously unacquainted college students engaged in brief                     
face-to-face interaction, and were subsequently asked how much they felt they had learned                         
about their partner, and how much they felt their partner had learned about them. In line                               
with the third study, the reports revealed a tendency among the students to think that they                               
had learned more about their partner during the conversation than their partner had                         
learned about them. 
Fifth study: ​Participants took a projective test in which they were asked to complete a                             
series of incomplete word fragments, such as “g _ _ l” and “c _ r _ _ r.” Afterwards, the                                       
participants were asked how revealing they felt the projective test had been of them, and                             
how revealing they felt it had been of the other participants. In line with the third and                                 
fourth study, the participants generally found their own word fragment completions to be                         
less revealing than those of other participants. 
3. Existing Explanations 
Although the primary concern of Pronin et al. is to establish ​that people suffer from an                               
illusion of asymmetric insight, they also consider three possible explanations of ​why people                         
might suffer from this illusion. Two of the explanations are based on the so-called                           
“self-enhancement bias” and the phenomenon of “naïve realism.” However, Pronin et al.                       
reject these explanations because that they are unable to account for certain details in the                             
experimental findings. Instead, they propose a third explanation, which is based on an                         
illusory conviction about how ​knowable ​we are compared to others. Below we review                         
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Pronin et al.’s discussion of all three explanations, and explain why we find their favored                             
explanation wanting. 
3.1 Explanations from Self-Enhancement Bias and Naïve Realism 
One line of explanation discussed and ultimately rejected by Pronin et al. (2001) sees the                             
illusion of asymmetric insight as a special instance of the so-called “self-enhancement bias.”                         
Numerous studies have shown that the majority of people take themselves to be                         
above-average on a wide range of desirable qualities and abilities, such as intelligence,                         
driving skills, and the like. Perhaps the claim to superior interpersonal insight should be                           1
understood as just another instance of this more general tendency. 
However, Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) rightly observe that if we simply subsume the                             
illusion of asymmetric insight under the self-enhancement bias, we risk overlooking                     
important details in the experimental findings. For example, as noted above, the tendency                         
to claim superiority in interpersonal knowledge was more pronounced for judgments                     
involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities rather than                   
public and observable ones, and for judgments involving negative qualities rather than                       
positive or neutral ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 652). While this finding is ​consistent with the                                 
view that the illusion of asymmetric insight is an instance of the self-enhancement bias, it is                               
not ​predicted by it. Thus, even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be seen as an                                 
instance of the self-enhancement bias, this would still leave important nuances in the                         
experimental findings unexplained. Another problem pointed out by Pronin et al. (2001,                       
p. 652) is that it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily                           
overestimate their own interpersonal insight, ​underestimate other people’s interpersonal                 
insight, or ​both​. Thus, given that the self-enhancement bias only covers tendencies to                         
overestimate oneself, the illusion of asymmetric insight might not be a clear-cut instance of                           
the self-enhancement bias. 
Pronin et al. also consider the possibility of understanding the illusion of asymmetric                         
insight as a manifestation of ​naïve realism​: the tendency to assume that one’s perception of                             
1 See Schlenker and Miller (1977), Greenwald (1980), Riess et al. (1981), Greenberg et al. (1982), and Mezulis                                   
et al. (2004) for studies and reviews of the self-enhancement bias. 
6 
 
the world accurately reflects what the world is really like. A notable consequence of naïve                             2
realism is that when people make conflicting judgments on some matter, each party will                           
tend to think that the other party’s judgment is biased or otherwise flawed. One might                             
naturally take this phenomenon to underlie the illusion of asymmetric insight: when                       
people make conflicting assessments of the personal characteristics of themselves or others,                       
each party will tend to think that the other party is wrong, and hence deem themselves                               
more successful at judging the personal characteristics of the other party than ​vice versa​.  
However, this explanation is limited in much the same way as the explanation from                           
the self-enhancement bias. Even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be appropriately                         
categorized as a manifestation of naïve realism, the explanatory value of such a                         
categorization will be limited in the absence of more detailed predictions of the                         
experimental results, such as the increased effect for judgments involving knowledge about                       
private or negative qualities. 
3.2 Explanations from Knowability and Introspection Illusions 
Consider next the explanation favoured by Proning et al. Several of the experiments                         
reviewed in §2 indicate that people tend to think that they are less knowable or “harder to                                 
access” than others. For example, the participants in the first study tended to deem their                             
own “true self” less “visible” or more “hidden beneath the surface” than that of their close                               
friend. Similarly, the participants in the third study provided self-descriptions that gave                       
more weight to inner unobservable events and feelings than did their descriptions of their                           
close friend. Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) take these findings to suggest that the reason why                                 3
people take themselves to have superior interpersonal insight is that they take themselves to                           
be less knowable than others. 
While we agree that the experimental findings indicate that people deem themselves                       
less knowable than others, we have doubts about the significance of this “knowability                         
illusion” in the context of explaining the illusion of asymmetric insight. The trouble is that                             
2 See Ichheiser (1949), Ross and Ward (1996), and Gilovich and Ross (2015) for studies and reviews of naïve                                     
realism. 
3 See also Goffman (1959), Markus (1983), and Andersen and Ross (1984) for studies and discussions of                                 
people’s convictions about their own and other people’s knowability. 
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we risk getting the ​explanatory direction wrong. It would seem more natural to explain the                             
knowability illusion in terms of the illusion of asymmetric insight than ​vice versa​. Here is                             
why: if people really do suffer from an illusory conviction to the effect that they themselves                               
are less knowable than others, this illusion is itself in need of an explanation. One plausible                               
explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into                           
others than ​vice versa​, and, on this basis, infer that they are generally less knowable than                               
others. For example, people might feel misunderstood more often than they take                       
themselves to misunderstand others, and hence eventually come to think of themselves as                         
being harder to access than others. Thus, even if people’s own explanation of their                           
perceived superior interpersonal insight is based on a belief to the effect that they                           
themselves are less knowable than others, the causal psychological explanation plausibly                     
goes the other way around: the tendency to think of oneself as having superior                           
interpersonal insight is what moves people to think that they are less knowable than other                             
people. 
In subsequent work, Pronin and colleagues have refined the explanation from                     
knowability by relating it to another well-documented illusion known as the                     
“introspection illusion:” the tendency to think that observable behavior is more revealing                       
of others than of oneself, and that access to private thoughts and feelings is more critical                               
when it is oneself, rather than someone else, who is being interpreted (Pronin et al. 2004                               
and 2008; Pronin and Kugler 2007; Pronin 2009). It has been suggested that the                           
introspection illusion may lead people to think that they are in a better position to gain                               
insight into others than ​vice versa​, thus giving rise to an illusion of asymmetric insight. For                               
example, Pronin et al. (2004) submit that the illusion of asymmetric insight is rooted in the                               
conviction that “knowing ​us ​demands that one enjoy access to our private thoughts,                         
feelings, motives, intentions, and so forth,” whereas “we can know ​others ​quite well solely                           
from paying attention to their behaviors, gestures, verbal responses, and other observable                       
manifestations” (Pronin et al. 2004, p. 794). A similar point is made by Pronin et al. (2008)                                 
who note that the illusion of asymmetric insight “has been traced to people’s tendency to                             
view their own spontaneous or off-the-cuff responses to others’ questions as relatively                       
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unrevealing even though they view others’ similar responses as meaningful” (Pronin et al.                         
2008, p. 797).  4
However, by using the introspection illusion to explain the illusion of asymmetric                       
insight, we once again run a risk of getting the explanatory direction wrong. If people                             
indeed suffer from an introspection illusion, this is itself in need of an explanation. A                             
plausible explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining                         
insight into others than ​vice versa​, and hence eventually come to conclude that the                           
third-personal evidence that they have about others must be comparatively more revealing                       
than the third-personal evidence that other people have about them. In other words, the                           
reason why people are moved to think that third-personal evidence is less revealing of them                             
than of others is that they take themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into                               
others than ​vice versa​. 
If this is the correct way of understanding the direction of explanation, any explanation                           
of the illusion of asymmetric insight that does not rely on the knowability and                           
introspection illusions will thereby help explain these latter two illusions as well. Thus,                         
since the explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that we propose in the following                             
does not rely on the knowability and introspection illusions, it promises to provide a                           
unified account of all three illusions. 
Another potential weakness of the explanations from the knowability and                   
introspection illusions is that it is difficult to see how these explanations could be extended                             
to the ​intrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight. Pronin et al. discuss the                             
interpersonal and intrapersonal versions of the illusion of asymmetric insight under the                       
same heading, and they seem to assume that they are equally well explained by the                             
knowability and introspection illusions. However, it is anything but clear that they ​are​. If                           
we think of ourselves as being less knowable than others, why should this lead us to think                                 
that we have superior intrapersonal insight? It seems odd to reason that since I am harder                               
4 On another possible reading of Pronin et al.’s discussion of the introspection illusions, they do no seek to                                     
explain the illusion of asymmetric insight in terms of the introspection illusion, but rather seek to explain                                 
both of these illusions in terms of the knowability illusion. However, even if this is the correct interpretation,                                   
our new explanation still provides a unified account of all three illusions, by providing an independent                               
explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight, which in turn explains the other two. 
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to know than others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. Likewise, it                             
seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing me than for                             
knowing others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. While our main                           
focus will be on the interpersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, we will also                               
show, in §5, how our explanation provides resources for understanding the intrapersonal                       
version. 
4. A New Explanation 
We now move on to present a new explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight. As                               
previously noted, it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily                       
tend to ​overestimate their own interpersonal insight, ​underestimate other people’s                   
interpersonal insight, or ​both​. But regardless of the relative significance of these tendencies,                         
it is clear that neither tendency on its own is enough to generate an illusion of asymmetric                                 
insight. If I overestimate my own interpersonal insight, I won’t suffer from an illusion of                             
asymmetric insight if I overestimate other people’s interpersonal insight to the same degree.                         
And if I underestimate other people’s interpersonal insight, I won’t suffer from an illusion                           
of asymmetric insight if I underestimate my own interpersonal insight to the same degree.                           
Thus, at a minimum, an explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight must explain a                             
differential assessment of how well people take themselves to know others as compared to                           
how well others know them. We will meet this requirement by showing how a few                             
well-founded psychological phenomena jointly predict a double tendency to ​overestimate                   
our own interpersonal insight and ​underestimate ​the interpersonal insight of others. 
4.1 Overestimating One’s Own Interpersonal Insight 
What might explain a tendency to overestimate one’s own ability to know others? We                           
submit that this tendency is predicted by the familiar, well-supported tendency to interpret                         
ambiguous evidence in a biased manner: 
Biased Assimilation of Evidence (BAE): People tend to interpret ambiguous                   
evidence as supportive of their prior opinions. 
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This tendency has been documented by a number of experimental findings across a wide                           
range of evidential domains. It is usually understood as an aspect of the more general                             
confirmation bias, which is the tendency to search for, interpret, and remember evidence                         
and information in ways that confirm one’s prior beliefs, and impede the possibility of                           
falsifying them. While early support for this general tendency came from Wason (1960),                         
the classic study documenting the specific bias in assimilating ambiguous evidence is Lord                         
et al. (1979). In their study, a group of participants, who were initially either for or against                                 
capital punishment, were presented with two sets of data on the effectiveness of capital                           
punishment as a deterrent; one set of data speaking in favor of such an effect, and another                                 
speaking against it. The studies revealed a tendency among the participants to have a more                             
favorable opinion of the data that supported their initial opinion, while being skeptical of                           
the data speaking against it. 
As Kunda (1990) notes, ambiguous evidence is particularly susceptible to biased                     
assimilation, since reality itself to some extent constrains what one is able to conclude from                             
a given body of evidence. One’s evidence cannot speak too compellingly against one’s prior                           
opinion if it is to allow for a biased interpretation. Since mixed or ambiguous bodies of                               
evidence do not do so, biased assimilation of such evidence becomes more likely. More                           
generally, we might say that the degree of susceptibility for biased assimilation of evidence                           
depends positively on the degree of ambiguity in the evidence, other things being equal.  5
We take it as relatively obvious that third-personal psychological evidence is often                       
quite ambiguous and open to interpretation, since it often leaves us to draw relatively                           
subtle abductive inferences about the inner feelings and motives of other people. Given                         
this background assumption, it is not hard to see how BAE predicts a tendency to                             
overestimate one’s own reliability in judging the personal characteristics of others. The                       
ambiguity of third-personal psychological evidence makes us prone to interpret the                     
evidence in a way that supports our initial judgments of the personal characteristics of                           
others. As a result, more false judgments are likely to be made and retained than we are                                 
5 For useful overviews, see Gilovich (1991, ch. 3) and Oswald and Grosjean (2004). 
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aware of, thereby making us prone to overestimate our own ability to judge the personal                             
characteristics of other people.  
To illustrate, suppose that Alice has come to regard Ben as being shy (say, based on                               
some relatively limited experience with him in social situations). Even if he is not in fact                               
shy, third-personal evidence of shyness is ambiguous, which means that Alice is likely to                           
interpret evidence gained in subsequent interaction with Ben in a way that supports her                           
initial judgment. As such, she stands to retain her initial judgment, even if a more balanced                               
assessment of the evidence would speak against it. Being unaware of this mistake, she takes                             
herself to know Ben better than she in fact does. 
Importantly, this explanation can account for the details in the experimental findings                       
that the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and naïve realism failed to predict,                         
namely that our tendency to think that we have superior interpersonal knowledge is                         
particularly pronounced in cases where the knowledge concerns private and unobservable                     
qualities, rather than public and observable ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 643). Our                           
explanation predicts this effect, since evidence about private and unobservable qualities is                       
likely to be more ambiguous than evidence about public and observable qualities, thus                         
leaving more room for biased assimilation, which in turn will strengthen the                       
overestimation of one’s own ability to know others. 
4.2 Underestimating the Interpersonal Insight of Others 
Given that people overestimate their ​own interpersonal knowledge, one might naturally                     
expect them to overestimate ​other ​people’s interpersonal knowledge as well, since this                       
would mean that they ascribed to others the same general capacities for interpersonal                         
knowledge that they find in themselves. However, if this were the case, we would not see                               
an illusion of asymmetric insight. What is needed is thus an explanation of why people do                               
not​ overestimate other people’s interpersonal insight, despite overestimating their own. 
At the root of our proposal lies a claim about people’s comparative assessments of                           
people’s capacity for ​self-knowledge​ versus knowledge of ​others​:  
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Overestimation of Self-Other Asymmetry (OSA): ​People tend to overestimate the                   
degree to which people’s self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of others.  
This tendency differs in two important respects from the knowability and introspection                       
illusions. First, OSA states that people overestimate how much better ​people in general are                           
at knowing themselves compared to knowing others. By contrast, the knowability and                       
introspection illusions are beliefs that people habour about ​themselves in particular​: that ​I                         
am less knowable than others, and that introspection is comparatively more important for                         
knowing ​me​. Second, OSA claims that we overestimate how much better people know                         
themselves than ​others​, whereas the knowability and introspection illusions consist of the                       
belief that we are in a better position to know ​others than others are to know ​us​. While this                                     
latter belief seems rather immodest (after all, why should we believe ourselves to be                           
special?), the overestimation described by OSA is much more subtle. There is nothing                         
obviously remarkable in thinking that we are all better placed to know ourselves than we                             
are to know others, and it is easy to see how one could come to overestimate the extent of                                     
this difference (more on this below). It is thus also a conviction that reasonable and                             
reflective people could easily hold. Note finally the relative weakness of OSA. The thesis                           
does not require, for example, that people believe themselves to be ​perfectly reliable in                           
knowing themselves. It suffices that they regard themselves as ​better at knowing themselves                         
than at knowing others, as long as they overestimate this difference in reliability. 
What reason is there to think that OSA is true? That we know ourselves better than we                                 
know others, at least in important respects, seems like a core commitment of                         
folk-psychology. Peter Carruthers (2008) goes as far as to maintain that a belief in what he                               
calls the ‘self-transparency’ of key aspects of our minds is species-universal and innate.                         
Carruthers relies mainly on theoretical considerations, including that an innate belief in                       
self-transparency would make good sense from an evolutionary perspective, but he also                       
notes some further explanatory virtues of this innateness hypothesis. For example, it would                         
explain the ‘near-ubiquity’ of belief in self-transparency in Western philosophy prior to the                         
writings of Sigmund Freud, and the surprised reactions of ordinary people to scientific                         
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results and theorizing about the mind which undermine the belief in self-transparency.                       
Indeed, when researchers in cognitive science present results indicating aspects of our                       
mental lives to which the subject does ​not enjoy privileged access, these results are often                             
presented as surprising, thus revealing that the researchers take for granted that people tend                           
to believe in self-transparency. 
Carruthers (2008) notes a lack of experimental work on the degree to which people                           
actually presume introspective access to their own minds. However, a later study by                         
Kozuch and Nichols (2011) sought to remedy this. They distinguished two dimensions of                         
the putative folk belief in introspective access, namely the ​power of the access, i.e. how                             
reliable people believe their introspective access to be, and the ​domain of access, i.e. what                             
types of mental events people believe they are able to introspect. Although they didn’t find                             
that people presume universal introspective access, they found that people do assume a                         
high degree of introspective access, especially in certain domains (we return to these                         
domains in a moment). 
Given that people think that they have a kind of access to their own minds that they                                 
do not have to the minds of others, what reason is there to suppose that they ​overestimate                                 
the superiority of this access? Here, we can distinguish two relevant sets of considerations,                           
one to do with the ​nature​ of the access, the other to do with the ​reliability​ of the access. 
In a classic study, Alison Gopnik (1993) argued that while we as adults believe that our                               
access to our own psychological states is different in nature to our access to the                             
psychological states of others, developmental evidence suggests that it is not. We tend to                           
believe that first-person knowledge is gained through direct perception, whereas                   
third-person knowledge must be inferred from behavior. But developmental evidence                   
suggests, she maintains, that both kinds of knowledge operate according to the same                         
interpretive principles. In another discussion, Carruthers (2010) provides further reason to                     
doubt the existence of a special form of introspective access to our own psychology, at least                               
if introspection is understood as a kind of cognitive pathway that is distinct from the way                               
in which we come to know psychological states of others. Carruthers advances a number of                             
arguments for this claim, including a lack of anatomical evidence, and the unexplained                         
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evolutionary extravagance that would be involved in developing a separate pathway for                       
understanding ourselves. These claims of Gopnik and Carruthers are of course compatible                       
with people having an accurate estimation of their relative abilities for knowing themselves                         
and others. After all, simply by experiencing one’s own behavior on a greater scale, subjects                             
plausibly have more and better psychological evidence about themselves than they have                       
about others. But a commitment to a false theory of self-knowledge as a matter of direct                               
perception or introspection does seem to go hand in hand with an exaggerated sense of ​how                               
much better we are at knowing ourselves over knowing others, which is what our thesis                             
claims. 
Moving on to the second set of considerations, this conclusion is in line with the very                               
significant body of research over the last several decades, demonstrating significant                     
limitations and exceptions to our reliability in knowing ourselves. Numerous studies                     
suggest that there are certain classes of attitudes, tendencies, processes, and personality                       
traits that we are systematically bad at detecting in ourselves. Following Wilson and Dunn                           
(2003), we can distinguish two broad categories of limitations to our self-knowledge,                       
which they label “motivational” and “non-motivational.” Motivational limitations extend                 
to e.g. uncomfortable memories, repressed “Freudian” beliefs, biases, undesirable                 
personality traits, and similar characteristics that people tend to have motivational reasons                       
for assessing in a skewed manner. Non-motivational limitations apply especially to much                       6
of the unconscious mental processing underlying reasoning, perception, motor learning,                   
attitude formation, decision-making, and more. As such, there might in fact be certain                         7
types of psychological states and characteristics that are more reliably detectable by                       
third-person evidence than by first-person evidence. In this connection, it is worth                       
remarking that in the aforementioned study by Kozuch and Nichols (2011), people were                         
particularly prone to overestimating the amount of self-access they had when it came to the                             
motivational basis for their own decisions and behavior. 
With this motivation of OSA in place, we can return to our main question. How does                               
OSA lead us to underestimate other people’s ability to gain insight into us? The basic                             
6 See Vazire (2010) for further discussion of motivational limitations to self-knowledge. 
7 See, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson (1977) for a classic study. 
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mechanism that we propose is this: sometimes we become aware of what personal or                           
psychological traits other people ascribe to us. These ascriptions may sometimes be                       
explicitly communicated, as when someone tells me that she thinks I am shy or prone to                               
anger. At other times, the ascriptions may be inferred from more subtle cues, as when I                               
become aware that someone seems overly careful not to make me angry, or appears to                             
imply that I would be uncomfortable in some particular social situation. We will not make                             
any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of these cues, but we take it that                             
we are at least sometimes in a position to make informed comparisons of our own                             
self-assessments with other people’s assessments of us. Naturally, these assessments                   
sometimes come into conflict. I might infer from your calming tone that you regard me as                               
anxious, while not regarding myself as anxious. Or I might take your bantering to indicate                             
that you regard me as a resilient person, while regarding myself as rather fragile. We will                               
again not make any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of such conflicts.                         
But a number of psychological studies indicate that people quite commonly experience a                         
feeling of being misunderstood by others.  8
In cases of conflicting assessments, OSA predicts that we will tend to regard our own                             
self-assessment as the one most likely to be correct on the grounds that, in general, people’s                               
self-knowledge tends to be superior to people’s knowledge of others. However, since we                         
tend to ​overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others, there will                             
be more cases of conflicting assessments in which the other person is right about us than                               
we think. Over time, we will thus come to regard other people as being less reliable in their                                   
judgments of our own personal characteristics than they really are. In other words, we will                             
come to underestimate their interpersonal insight. 
As with the mechanism proposed in §4.1, this mechanism also predicts the details                         
found in Study 2, that the illusion of asymmetric insight was particularly pronounced in                           
cases where participants felt that knowledge of them would require access to private                         
thoughts and feelings, and in cases where the knowledge concerned negative or undesirable                         
8 See e.g. Lun et al. (2008) and Oishi et al. (2013) for recent studies and literature reviews on people’s                                       




qualities. As previously mentioned, we are particularly prone to overestimating our own                       
self-knowledge when it comes to these exact qualities. In fact, when finding an increased                           
effect with respect to qualities that require access to private thoughts and feelings, Pronin                           
et al. focused in particular on grounds and motivations for decisions and behavior (e.g.:                           
‘motives for action, doing things just for the purpose of fitting in, and doing things just for                                 
the purpose of pleasing others’ (2001: 643)). And it is with respect to these very qualities                               
that Kozuch and Nichols (2011) found that people were most prone to overestimate their                           
self-knowledge. For these qualities we are therefore likely to be particularly dismissive of                         
other people’s conflicting assessments of us. 
Putting this effect together with the one described in §4.1, we have an explanation                           
both of the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight and of the tendency to                             
underestimate that of others. The first effect is grounded in the general tendency to                           
accommodate evidence in a biased way, which becomes strengthened by the ambiguous                       
nature of third-personal psychological evidence. The second effect is grounded in the                       
exaggerated conviction that people’s self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of                     
others, which leads us to dismiss other people’s assessments of ourselves more often than                           
we should. 
It is worth pointing out that our belief that we are in a better position to know                                 
ourselves than we are to know others need not be false or exaggerated for our explanation                               
of the illusion of asymmetric insight to hold, although the effect will be weaker if the belief                                 
is accurate. If the belief is accurate, we will not underestimate the ability of others to know                                 
us, but rather come to a more realistic assessment of their ability. When we become aware                               
of other people’s assessments of us, and they conflict with our own self-assessments, we                           
will still dismiss their assessments because of our belief in the superiority of self-knowledge                           
over knowledge of others. But if our self-knowledge really is as superior as we take it to be,                                   
our dismissals of other people’s assessments will be largely correct, and our assessment of                           
their ability to know others will therefore also be more accurate. However, because of our                             
tendency to overestimate our own ability to know others, we will still regard ourselves as                             
better at knowing others, than others are at knowing us, thus retaining weaker version of                             
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the illusion of asymmetric insight. That being said, we think that the research summarized                           
above does give us strong reason to think that we have an exaggerated sense of our ability to                                   
know ourselves, as described by OSA. 
5. Interactions of BAE and OSA 
We have now seen how BAE and OSA can work in tandem to generate an illusion of                                 
asymmetric insight. However, the two can also interact with each other in a more direct                             
manner. In fact, BAE and OSA can sometimes ​counteract ​each other. To illustrate, suppose                           
that Alice judges Ben to be shy. How will Alice react if she learns that Ben does not                                   
consider himself to be shy? If we were to focus exclusively on OSA, we should expect Alice                                 
to trust Ben’s judgment because she thinks that people in general know themselves better                           
than others know them. But if we were to focus exclusively on BAE, we should expect                               
Alice to place greater weight on her own judgment because she tends to assimilate                           
third-personal evidence in a biased manner. Thus, in cases like these, OSA and BEA pull in                               
opposite directions. What should we make of this? 
First and most importantly, the fact that BAE and OSA can sometimes have                         
opposite-directed effects does not undermine the explanation proposed in the previous                     
section. Most obviously, the second part of the explanation remains intact because BAE                         
does not generate any countereffect in those cases where OSA leads us to place too little                               
weight on other people’s judgments of us. If anything, we should expect BAE to ​bolster the                               
effect of OSA in cases where your judgment of me conflicts with my own judgment of                               
myself. Only a little less obviously, the first part of the explanation also remains intact                             
because the occasional countereffect of OSA does not change the fact that BAE in general                             
makes us prone to interpret third-personal evidence in a way that supports our prior                           
opinions. The effect of BAE may well be ​mitigated to some extent by the interaction with                               
OSA. But we should expect the overall pattern to be the same, namely that we are likely to                                   
make and retain more false judgments about other people’s personal characteristics than we                         
are aware of, thereby leading us to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. Hence, the                           
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interaction between BAE and OSA does not undermine our explanation of the illusion of                           
asymmetric insight. 
On the contrary, we can use the interaction between BAE and OSA to explain two                             
further psychological effects documented by Pronin et al. The first effect is the previously                           
mentioned ​intrapersonal illusion of asymmetric insight: the tendency to think that we                       
know ourselves better than other people know themselves. This tendency was                     
demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in §2, but was found to be overall less                                 
pronounced than the interpersonal illusion. The interaction between BAE and OSA                     
predicts exactly that. To see why, suppose again that Alice and Ben make conflicting                           
judgments about whether Ben is shy. The effect of OSA will be to make Alice inclined to                                 
trust Ben’s judgment. However, BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading                       
Alice to think that her own judgment of Ben is more accurate than Ben’s judgment of                               
himself. As a result, Alice will tend to underestimate, at least to some extent, how well Ben                                 
knows himself. By contrast, if Alice and Ben make conflicting judgments about whether                         
Alice ​is shy, BAE will obviously not have the effect of leading Alice to underestimate how                               
well she knows herself. On the present picture, this is why we tend to think that we know                                   
ourselves better than others know themselves. 
The second effect consists of a tendency to think that we know ourselves ​much ​better                             
than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only ​slightly ​better than we                           
know them. This tendency was also demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in                             
§2, and was found to be highly sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed                                 
trait. For example, Alice would take her knowledge of her own “shyness” (a                         
low-observability trait) to be much better than Ben’s knowledge of her shyness, whereas                         
she would only take Ben’s knowledge of his shyness to be slightly better than her                             
knowledge of his shyness. By contrast, Alice would take her knowledge of her own                           
“messiness” (a high-observability trait) to be only slightly better than Ben’s knowledge of                         
her messiness, whereas she would take Ben’s knowledge of his messiness to no better (in                             
fact, slightly ​worse​) than her knowledge of his messiness. These effects are exactly what we                             9
9 These effects are illustrated in Figure 1 (Pronin et al. 2001: 644). 
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should expect from the interaction between BAE and OSA. In general, OSA makes us                           
inclined to think that people know themselves better than others know them. However,                         
BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading us to think that we know others                             
better than they know themselves, especially for traits that are high in external                         
observability. By contrast, BAE does not have the effect of sometimes leading us to think                             
that others know us better than we know ourselves. As a result, we will tend to                               
underestimate how well others know themselves, without underestimating how well we                     
know ourselves. On the present picture, that is why we tend to think that we know                               
ourselves much better than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only                         
slightly better than we know them.  10
In sum, BAE and SOA not only jointly predict the interpersonal illusion of                         
asymmetric insight, but allow us to explain in detail several related phenomena as well. 
6. Comparisons with Existing Explanations 
In this section, we compare our explanation from §4 with the ones discussed in §3. We                               
begin by revisiting the shortcomings that led us to reject the existing explanations. In                           
relation to the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection, we raised                         
the worry that they got the explanatory direction wrong. Even if people really do tend to                               
deem themselves less knowable than others, we argued that it is more natural to explain this                               
conviction in terms of people’s tendency to deem themselves superior at knowing others,                         
rather than letting the explanation go the other way around. Our explanation does not raise                             
a similar worry. Although our explanation is partly based on a general belief about the                             
comparative epistemic positions of oneself and others, the content of this belief is that                           
subjects in general enjoy a superior access to their own mental state, which clearly cannot                             
be explained in terms of a tendency to regard oneself as superior at knowing others. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that believing oneself to enjoy superior access to one’s                           
own mental state is ​prima facie much more reasonable, and thus less in need of                             
explanation, than believing oneself to be less knowable than others. Indeed, if Carruthers                         
10 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this effect to our attention. 
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(2008) is right, there is reason to think that an exaggerated belief in the superiority of                               
self-knowledge is innate, or at least a very basic commitment of folk-psychology. 
Finally, since our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight does not rely on the                             
illusions of knowability and introspection, we plausibly have an explanation of the latter                         
two illusions as well, as argued in §3. This promises to provide us with a highly unified                                 
picture of a wide range of otherwise disparate psychological phenomena. Obviously, we                       
have not offered anything like a complete picture of how these phenomena hang together.                           
In particular, it may require further experimental work to establish whether the                       
knowability and introspection illusions can indeed be explained in terms of the illusion of                           
asymmetric insight, as we have suggested, or whether they should rather be seen as arising                             
directly from BAE and OSA, and hence as being “on a par” with the illusion of asymmetric                                 
insight at the level of explanation. But we take the foregoing considerations to suggest that                             
BAE and OSA at least provide us with the basic ingredients for a unified understanding of                               
the knowability and introspection illusions and the illusion of asymmetric insight. 
In relation to the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and naïve realism,                       
Pronin et al. pointed out that they are too general to account for specific details in the                                 
experimental findings. In particular, they failed to explain the heightened tendency to                       
claim superior interpersonal knowledge about negative qualities and qualities that require                     
access to private thoughts and feelings. By contrast, we have seen that our explanation                           
predicts exactly this effect. 
A further potential weakness of the explanation from self-enhancement bias was that                       
it is unclear from the experimental findings whether the illusion of asymmetric insight is                           
primarily a result of a tendency to ​overestimate one’s own interpersonal insight,                       
underestimate other people’s interpersonal insight, or ​both​. Thus, it remains unclear                     
whether the illusion of asymmetric insight can indeed be categorized as an instance of the                             
self-enhancement bias. By contrast, our account offers explanatory resources regardless of                     
how this question is settled, since it relies both an explanation of our tendency to                             
overestimate ourselves and of our tendency to underestimate others. 
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Finally, neither of the explanations reviewed in §3 are well-placed to account for the                           
effects discussed in §5. Most obviously, the explanations from the self-enhancement bias                       
and naïve realism are too general to make any detailed predictions about why the effects                             
discussed in §5 should be sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed trait.                               
But the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection also fall short. As                           
argued in §3.2, it is unclear how the knowability and introspection illusions would generate                           
a tendency to think that we know ourselves better than other people know themselves. The                             
same goes for the tendency to think that we know ourselves ​much ​better than other people                               
know us, whereas other people know themselves only slightly better than we know them. It                             
seems odd to reason that since I am harder to know than you, I must know myself much                                   
better than you know me, whereas you know yourself only slightly better than I know you.                               
Likewise, it seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing                           
me than for knowing you, I must know myself much better than you know me, whereas                               
you know yourself only slightly better than I know you. Thus, the knowability and                           
introspection illusions seem unable to explain the effects discussed in §5. 
Taken together, these considerations make what seems to us an overall strong case in                           
favor of our explanation from §4 and against the ones reviewed in §3. 
7. A Third-Personal Illusion? 
In this final section, we want to bring attention to a hypothesis that is related to, but                                 
importantly different from, the ones discussed in the foregoing. This is the hypothesis that                           
people tend to think that they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing                               
others. To illustrate, if Alice and Ben consider how well they know a third person Claire,                               11
Alice will tend to think that she knows Claire better than Ben does, and Ben will likewise                                 
tend to think he knows Claire better than Alice does. Let us call this putative effect the                                 
third-personal illusion of asymmetric insight. To our knowledge, this illusion has not yet                         
been tested by experiment. 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to consider this. 
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Apart from its independent interest, the third-personal illusion is interesting in the                       
present context because it may provide further assistance in adjudicating between the                       
competing explanations of the illusion of asymmetric insight discussed so far. The illusion                         
is predicted by our own explanation because, on this account, we will tend to overestimate                             
our own ability to know others, while at the same time underestimating the ability of                             
others to know us. And since this underestimation is not based on us believing ourselves to                               
be especially hard to know, but rather on a belief about the superiority of self-knowledge in                               
general, the resulting underestimation of others will not be restricted to their knowledge of                           
ourselves in particular. The explanation thus predicts that people will tend to think that                           
they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing others. 
The third-personal illusion is also predicted by the explanations from                   
self-enhancement and naïve realism. If the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a                         
manifestation of the general tendency to think that one is above-average on a wide range of                               
desirable qualities and abilities, including the ability to know others, one will plausibly also                           
manifest the third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Likewise, if the illusion of                     
asymmetric insight is primarily a manifestation of naïve realism, which leads one to assume                           
that those who disagree with oneself must be mistaken, one will also manifest the                           
third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Note, however, that even if the third-personal                     
illusion is eventually confirmed, we have already seen that our explanation remains                       
superior to the explanations from self-enhancement and naïve realism. 
Interestingly, the third-personal illusion is ​not predicted by the explanations based on                       
the illusions of knowability and introspection. According to both of these explanations,                       
the illusion of asymmetric insight arises as a result of believing ​oneself to be especially                             
difficult to know. But such a belief does not have any obvious implications for how one                               
will compare the abilities of oneself and others to know ​other people. One may well regard                               
oneself as difficult to know, while regarding oneself and others as equally good at knowing                             
others. If it turns out to be true, the third-personal illusion will thus speak in favor of our                                   
explanation, and speak against Pronin et al.’s explanations; and ​vice versa if the hypothesis                           




We began this paper by reviewing a group of studies reported by Pronin et al. (2001),                               
which suggest that people tend to think that they know others better than others know                             
them (§2). We then argued that existing explanations of this “illusion of asymmetric                         
insight” are wanting (§3), and went on to propose a new explanation of the illusion, based                               
on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate                   
ambiguous evidence in a biased manner, and the tendency to overestimate how much                         
better we know ourselves than we know others (§4). Subsequently, we showed that our                           
explanation can also account for two further psychological effects documented by Pronin                       
et al. (§5), and argued that it outperforms existing explanations on several different counts                           
(§6). Finally, we described a hitherto untested “third-personal” illusion of asymmetric                     
insight, predicted by our account, which we hope to test in future experimental work (§7). 
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